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CASE NOTES
not hear taxpayers' claims. Also, there was a genuine dispute present. The
petitioner actually was seeking relief. All interested parties, presented argu-
ments to the Court. This would have been an opportunity to make an exception
to the long established court-made rule of standings, i.e., allow a taxpayer
capacity to bring an action under these circumstances, especially where such a
large fiscal matter is involved. But even though the Court does not choose to
overrule the standing doctrine, it is still within the power of the Legislature to
pass a statute permitting standing for constitutional issues of great public im-
portance.
Anthony S. Kowalski
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVATE BILL TO NEGATIVE STATUTE OF
LIITATIONS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
On September 21, 1954, the State of New York issued its check for
$6,053.29 to the Homer Engineering Company. This check represented full
payment for certain work performed by the company on a state hospital build-
ing. While the offices of Homer Engineering Company were being moved from
one city to another, this check was inadvertently lost.' More than six years
elapsed before the check was discovered. Due to this extensive lapse of time,
the state comptroller would not have honored the check.2 Thereafter, the State
Legislature passed a private bill3 conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims
to hear the Homer Engineering Company's claim even though it might be
barred by lapse of time. The Court of Claims heard the claim and granted
Homer Engineering Company judgment in the sum of $6,053.29. Judge Scileppi,
speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeals, overruled the'Court of Claims. An
enabling act purporting to grant jurisdiction for a claim against the state which
would have been barred had it been a claim between private citizens, violates
the New York State Constitution. Homer Engineering Co., Inc. v. State of New
York 12 N.Y.2d 508, 191 N.E.2d 455, 240 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1963).
At common law, in the absence of a specific statute, there was no fixed time
in which a cause of action had to be brought.4 The first such statute was passed
in 1623.r At present it is the policy of the State that there shall be a fixed limit
to the time in which any legal or equitable cause of action can be brought. 6
The statutes are founded, at least partially, on the policy of preventing litigation
which may be commenced long after records relating thereto are lost and the'
memories of the parties have grown vague. 7 There is also a notion that failure to
1. Record, vol. 1, p. 20.
2. N.Y. Fin. Law § 102.
3, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 537.
4. Hart v. Deshong, 40 Del. (1 Terry) 218, 8 A.2d 85 (1939).
5. An Act for Limitation of Actions, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16.
6. Glover v. National Bank of Commerce, 156 App. Div. 247, 141 N.Y. Supp. 409 (1st
Dep't 1913).
7. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
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press a claim in a timely fashion creates a presumption against the validity of the
claim.8 Statutes of limitation are frequently termed statutes of repose since they
are designed to set at rest, after a definite period, the right to proceed with a
cause of action.' ° The statute of limitations is, of course, available only as a
defense." It is not strictly a technical defense' 2 however, as it serves the
beneficient purpose of barring the assertion of state claims.'3 It is frequently
emphasized that the statute of limitations does not affect the substantive rights
claimed but rather serves as a positive bar to litigation.14 The statute operates
against natural as well as artificial persons.' 5 Admittedly, it may at times bar the
assertion of a just claim and thereby cause hardship. These occasional hard-
ships have been found, however, to be outweighed by the advantage of inhibiting
the prosecution of untimely law suits.' 6
A claim based on an implied or expressed contract must be brought within
six years after the cause of action has accrued or it will be barred by the statute
of limitations. 17 When a contractual claim is represented by an ordinary check
or bill of exchange, the cause of action accrues as of the date of the issuance and
delivery of the instrument.' 8 Provisions in the New York State Finance Law
recognize this by providing that a record of all unpaid checks must be retained
for a period of six years.' 9 However, the State Legislature generally has control
over the statute of limitations as applied to litigation either between citizens or
between a citizen and the state.20 The Legislature may also enact a statute of
limitations which has the effect of reviving a cause of action barred by a pre-
viously applicable statute of limitations.2 ' This emphasizes the importance of
the principle that the statute of limitations does not affect the right but only
bars the remedy.22 In addition to the Legislature's power to change the statute
of limitations it may also legalize claims which, although technically invalid,
are nevertheless morally and equitably binding23 They are not prohibited from
8. Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943).
9. Arnold v. Mayal Realty Co., 299 N.Y. 57, 85 N.E.2d 616 (1949); Gregoire v. G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
10. Gorowitz v. Blumenstein, 184 Misc. 111, 53 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
11. People v. Durey, 126 Misc. 642, 653, 214 N.Y. Supp. 418, 429 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
12. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Intercontinental Corp., 277 App. Div. 13, 97 N.Y.S.2d 678
(1st Dep't 1950).
13. See, e.g., Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
14. Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., 207 App. Div. 454,457, 202 N.Y. Supp. 378,
380 (2d Dep't 1923) ; Santasieri v. Crane, 175 Misc. 375, 23 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
15. Wehrenberg v. New York, N.H., & H. R.R., 124 App. Div. 205, 108 N.Y. Supp. 704
(1st Dep't 1908).
16. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 302, 200 N.E. 824,
827-28 (1936).
17. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(1), N.Y.CPLR § 213(2).
18. Donlon v. Davidson, 7 App. Div. 461, 39 N.Y. Supp. 1020 (4th Dep't 1896);
Farrell v. City of New York, 197 Misc. 1059, 98 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1950).
19. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 102.
20. Rexford v. Knight, 11 N.Y. 308 (1854).
21. Denkensohn v. Ridgway Apts., 13 Misc. 2d 389, 180 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. App. T.
1958).
22. Application of Addesso, 69 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
23. Stone v. Graves, 258 App. Div. 381, 17 N.Y.S.2d 379 (3d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 283
N.Y. 470, 28 N.E.2d 919 (1940).
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doing on behalf of the State that which a sense of justice and equity would
dictate to an honorable person.24 The test generally is whether the claim ap-
pears to the judicial conscience to belong to the class of claims which the Legis-
lature in its exercise of wide discretion might reasonably say is founded in
equity.2 5 The circumstances should be so exceptional as to satisfy the court
that serious injustice would result if the intentions of the Legislature were not
effectuated.20 The Legislature is, however, constitutionally forbidden from
auditing, allowing, or paying a claim which as between citizens of the state
would be barred by lapse of time. 27 This provision is construed to set the
outer limit with respect to the age of a claim against the State.2 8 The Legisla-
ture may only waive its temporal requirements within that limit.
2 9
The reasoning of the Court in this case is clear and compelling. If this claim
had existed between private citizens, it would clearly have been barred by the
six-year statute of limitations.30 The constitutional provision involved in this case
has been construed to prohibit the Legislature from subjecting the State to a less
favorable time limitation than the one enjoyed by private citizens.31 The enabling
act, by allowing the Court of Claims to hear this claim even though it would
be barred if it were between citizens, is violative of the State Constitution and
is therefore void. The Court admits that the result reached in the instant case
may seem harsh and unfair but insists that well established authorities compel
the result. In an attempt to ameliorate the harshness of the decision, the Court
points out that the claimant could have acquired a duplicate of the mislaid check
at any time during a six-year period by making application to the Comptroller.
The Court, in this case, felt compelled to follow a constitutional mandate
by disallowing an apparently just claim. While it is apparent that the claimant
in this action was negligent in not noticing a shortage in his accounts of over
$6,000, it is equally apparent that as a result of this decision, the State is un-
justly enriched by that same amount. In enforcing the statute of limitations and
the constitutional provision related thereto, the Court has never adverted to the
underlying purposes of either. The statute of limitations is aimed at preventing
the injustice of forcing a defendant to litigate a claim which is far removed in
time from the present.32 This would be unjust in that the defendant may no
longer be able to acquire either oral or documented evidence because of the
extensive lapse of time. 33 This possible injustice does not appear to be present
24. Ausable Chasm Co. v. State, 266 N.Y. 326, 194 N.E. 843 (1935).
25. Campbell v. State, 186 Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
26. Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co.. 301 N.Y. 164, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950).
27. N.Y. Const. art. III § 19.
28. Oswego & Syracuse R.R. Co. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 361, 124 N.E. 8, 12 (1919);
accord, City of Buffalo v. State, 116 App. Div. 539, 101 N.Y. Supp. 595 (3d Dep't 1906),
aff'd, 191 N.Y. 534, 84 N.E. 1110 (1908); Coish v. State, 23 Misc. 2d 117, 203 N.Y.S.2d 748
(Ct. Cl. 1960) (wrongful death action).
29. Ibid.
30. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(1).
31. Oswego & Syracuse R.R. Co. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 361, 124 N.E. 8, 12 (1919).
32. Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
33. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 244 App. Div. 606, 280 N.Y. Supp.
836 (4th Dep't 1935).
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in the instant case for there are no disputed facts.3 4 The claimant has possession
of the appellant's check. The State admittedly owes the claimant the sum de-
manded, and thus the purpose of the statute of limitations is not being erved.
On the other hand, the purpose of the constitutional provision limiting claims to
those which would not be barred if occurring between private citizens is to prevent
grossly unjust claims from being allowed by a special act of the Legislature. 3
In the instant case, there is no reason to believe that this is such a claim. The
contract was faithfully performed by claimant for his work. The Court's decision,
then, does not appear to follow the spirit of either the statute of limitations or
the constitutional provision. To hold otherwise, however, the Court would have
had to disregard the clear mandate of both.
George P. Doyle
CRIMINAL LAW-INCULPATORY STATEMENTS GIVEN BEFORE ARRAIGN-
MENT WHERE CONSULTATION WITH COUNSEL REFUSED, Now INADMISSABLE.
Defendant Donovan was arrested as a suspect in connection with the killing
of a guard shot during a payroll robbery. The arrest was accomplished at about
7:30 p.m. on Thursday, May 11, 1961.1 Defendant was thereafter questioned
continuously until 3:00 a.m. of May 12.2 Interrogation was resumed later the
same morning, and, at 10:00 a.m., Donovan admitted complicity in the crime.3
In mid-afternoon of the same day, counsel retained by defendant's family
requested access to the defendant but was turned away by the officers in charge.
4
On the heels of this incident, an assistant district attorney conducted a question
and answer session with the defendant.3 This conversation yielded a lengthy
inculpatory statement which the defendant signed in the closing hours of the
day.6 On the morning of May 13, approximately one and one half days after
arrest, defendant was arraigned. All evidence acquired during this period, includ-
ing defendant's written statement, was admitted at trial. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty against Donovan and one co-defendant without recommenda-
tion of leniency.7 Both defendants were then sentenced to death. On direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals, held, reversed, with three judges joining in the majority
opinion, one concurring and three dissenting. Under the New York Constitution,
both the provision assuring right to counsel and the guarantee of due process,
require exclusion of inculpatory statements given by the accused during informal,
pre-arraignment proceedings if, prior to the time the damaging statement was
34. Instant case at 510, 191 N.E.2d at 456, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
35. Cayuga County v. State, 153 N.Y. 279, 47 N.E. 288 (1897).
1. Record, vol. 1, pp. 179-80.
2. Record, vol. 2, p. 992.
3. Record, vol. 1, pp. 233-39.
4. Record, vol. 2, pp. 1017-18.
5. Record, vol. 2, p. 787.
6. Record, vol. 2, pp. 790-91.
7. Record, vol. 1, pp. 15-16.
